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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED:
1.

Does Jeanne's failure to marshal the evidence prevent

her from challenging the trial court's findings of fact?
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review: In order to
challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the
challenger "must marshal all the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
to support the findings in question."

Marshall v. Marshall,

915

P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

2.

Were the trial court's findings of fact clearly

erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence?
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review.

Brent Loveless

argued the validity of the facts in his trial memorandum. Record
at 275. The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.

Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174,

1175 (Utah 1989).

3.

Was the trial court's valuation of the marital property

1

a clear abuse of discretion?
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review.

Brent Loveless

preserved this issue in his trial memorandum. Record at 275.

A

trial court's valuation of marital property will not be disturbed
absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905

P.2d 877, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

4,

Does Jeanne's frivolous appeal warrant an award of

attorney's fees?
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review.

This issue is

appropriately raised in a Brief to the Court of Appeals.

Such an

award is a matter of discretion for the appellate court. Hunt v.
Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990).

STATUTES THAT ARE DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL
The Appellant has asked this Court only to review Findings
of Fact, therefore, there are no Statutes that are determinative
of appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order signed and dated the 14th of
February, 1997.

Record at 347.

Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below

2

This matter came before the trial court on September 3, and
18, 1996. Both parties testified.

Central issues were when to

value the home and if Jeanne Loveless was entitled to any
interest in the home or its appreciation in value.
The trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Ruling on
December 10, 1996.

The court awarded Brent Loveless his

premarital home free of any claim by Jeanne Loveless and valued
the home at the time of separation.
the Order on February 14th, 1997.

The court signed and entered

Jeanne Loveless appeals from

that Order.

Statement of Facts
1.

Brent Loveless is the custodial parent of four

children, who have lived with his children in his present home
since October 1990. Record at 40.
2.

Brent built the home in which he and his children

resided before his marriage to Jeanne.
construction himself.
3.

He did most of the

Record at 40.

Brent and Jeanne were married on March 11, 1994. Record

at 40.
4.

Brent and Jeanne maintained separate finances

throughout the short marriage.

Brent paid the household

expenses, including mortgage, utilities, groceries, taxes,
telephone service, and other debts from his own checking account
to which Jeanne did not contribute.
3

Record at 40.

5.

Before the marriage Brent landscaped the yards and

property and installed a deck.

Only the flower beds were built

and planted after the marriage.
6.

Record at 369.

Brent spent over $2,100 during the marriage in

completing the downstairs rooms.
7.

Record at 370.

In June of 1995, 14 months into the marriage, Jeanne

secretly and unknown to Brent applied for housing assistance and
occupancy in an apartment complex in Payson, Utah.

Record at

371.
8.

She misrepresented her marital status on her

application, and concealed this entire action from Brent.

Record

at 365.
9.

Because of the tight rental market, there was no

vacancy in the apartment complex at that time.
10.

Record at 366.

As soon as an apartment became available in December

1995, or 21 months after the marriage, Jeanne moved into the
complex and the parties separated.
11.

Record at 371.

Shortly before their marriage, Brent's house was

refinanced.

It was appraised at $98,000.

At the time of

separation (21 months later), the appraised value was $137,000.
At the time of trial (30 months after the marriage), the
appraised value was between $137,000 and $143,000.

Record at

392.
12.

All but $6,600 of the increase in value to the home is

attributable to the appreciation of real estate in Utah County.
4

The remaining $6,600 increase in value is attributable to the
completion of basement rooms.
13.

Record at 395.

Jeanne did little to improve the value of the home

other than routine maintenance. She purchased some flowers and
stained the doors and moldings.

Jeanne did give her son a

washer, dryer and bed in exchange for labor.
14.

Brent paid the mortgage payments and utilities on the

home during the marriage.
15.
month.

Record at 40.

Prior to the marriage, Jeanne paid rent of $487 per

After separation, she only paid $361. Record at 367.

16.

The parties never commingled their income.

Brent paid

the family living expenses. Jeanne spent her income on a car
payment, alcohol, and Sunday dinners.
herself.
17.

She kept the rest for

Record at 40.
At the time of marriage, Jeanne worked at Walmart

making $6.20 per hour. At the time of separation she was earning
$7.50 working for Neways. At the time of trial she was earning
$9.00 per hour.
18.
marriage.
19.

Record at 367.

Brent's income remained constant throughout the
Record at 375.
Jeanne brought considerable debt into the marriage,

which was paid off during the marriage with marital funds.
Record at 372.
20.

Brent incurred debt during the marriage, including

significant credit card debt incurred after Jeanne began planning
5

her separation in June 1995. Brent would not have incurred these
expenses had he known of Jeanne's plan to leave him as soon as
housing was available.
21.

Record at 371-72.

The trial court allowed Brent to retain his family's

premarital home because the home was Brent's before marriage, he
paid the mortgage and utility expenses from his own income, he
paid for almost all of the improvements, and the marriage was of
short duration (the parties married March 1994 and separated
December 1995, although Jeanne began her plans to separate in
June 1995).

Record at 323.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Jeanne Loveless has failed to "marshal the evidence" as
required by this Court in order to challenge findings of fact.
Thus, she should be prevented from challenging those findings.
Even if she had marshaled the evidence, the trial court's
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous nor against the great
weight of the evidence.
and specific findings

In fact, the trial court made extensive

which included testimony from the parties.

It is clear from the record that the trial court's findings were
well grounded in the evidence before the court.
In assigning the marital debts, the trial court again made
specific and extensive findings which are well supported by the
record.

From that record, the trial court acted within its

6

discretion in assigning portions of the marital debt to the
parties and allowing for offsets of payments.
The trial court did not "clearly abuse its discretion" in
assigning a value to Brent's home.

While property is generally

valued at the time of trial, Utah courts have stated that this
"is not an intractable rule." Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559,
563 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

The trial court's deviation from the

general rule must be sufficiently detailed to explain the basis
its ruling.

Id. at 688.

The trial court made detailed findings

in regard to the valuation of Brent's home.

The trial court

correctly judged the respective interests of the parties as of
the time of separation.
The trial court acted within its discretion to allow Brent
to retain his premarital home.

The court made extensive findings

with regard to the payments made to enhance the value of the
home.

In the short duration of the marriage, Jeanne did little

to add to the value of the home.

The payments made by Brent were

not marital payments since the parties did not commingle their
funds and Brent was separately responsible for paying the
mortgage, utility, and tax expenses associated with the house.
Finally, Brent is entitled to his attorney's fees in this
appeal.

Jeanne Loveless' arguments are frivolous.

She has

failed to marshal the evidence in her attack on the trial court's
findings of fact. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than
in the final "Point" of her Brief in which she accuses the trial
7

court of prejudice and "wrongful favoring."

Appellants Brief at

15.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
JEANNE'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE PREVENTS HER FROM
CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
Jeanne Loveless has failed to "marshal the evidence" as
required by this Court in order to challenge findings of fact.
Thus, she should be prevented from challenging those findings.
This court has stated:
"[I]n order to challenge a trial court's findings of
fact on appeal, the challenger must marshal all the
evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings in question. We will uphold the
trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to
appropriately marshal all of the evidence.
Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(citations omitted).

In viewing this marshaled evidence, the

evidence must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the
findings" and the evidence must still be "insufficient to support
the findings."

Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1,7 (Utah Ct. App.

1992).
When a party challenging findings of fact fails to marshal
all of the evidence, the Court of Appeals upholds the trial
court's findings of fact.

See Allred v. Brown, 893 P.2d 1087,

1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877,
882 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Marshall, 915 P.2d at 516.

Here, Jeanne Loveless has failed to marshal "all of the
evidence", much less demonstrate why the evidence, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the findings, would be insufficient.
Instead, she has simply restated the evidence she believes
supports her position and reargued the original case to this
Court.

In Marshall v. Marshall, this Court was faced with

similar pleadings. There, the court concluded:
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence but
has merely recited the findings on point and then
highlighted the evidence which he deems contrary to the
findings.
Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial
court's findings and affirm the awards on appeal.
915 P.2d at 516.

Likewise, in Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, a case

cited by Jeanne in her brief, the court refused to disturb the
trial court's findings because the appellant had "not marshaled
th§ evidence, but had merely reargued the evidence supporting his
position."

875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Similarly, Jeanne has failed to marshal all of the
evidence.

She has failed to show why, when viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings.

Lastly, she has merely

reargued the evidence supporting her position.

Accordingly, this

Court should not disturb the trial court's findings of fact and
should affirm the court's judgment.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF PACT WERE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS NOR
AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF TH£ EVIDENCE

9

Even if Jeanne had marshaled the evidence, the trial court's
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous nor against the great
weight of the evidence.

As stated earlier,

To mount a successful attack on the trial court's
factual findings, an appellant must marshal all the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and
then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings, or that its
findings are otherwise clearly erroneous. A finding is
clearly erroneous, when, even though there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court is xleft with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.'
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations
omitted) .

Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that "findings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."
Here, the trial court made extensive and specific findings
from the separate hearings which included testimony from the
parties.
Although Jeanne has failed to specifically identify which
findings of fact were erroneous, the challenges made to the
court's findings will each be addressed.
A.
It was within the trial court's discretion to assign marital
debts.
One challenge made to the court's findings of fact has to
deal with the court's assignation of marital debt.
10

In assigning

the marital debts, the trial court again made specific and
extensive findings which are well supported by the record.

From

that record, the trial court acted within its discretion in
assigning portions of the marital debt to the parties and
allowing for offsets of payments.
The only finding with regard to marital debt which is
challenged by Jeanne is the court's finding that during the
marriage, $2,531 of marital debt was charged to Brent's
Mastercard.

Record at 322.

The court ordered Jeanne to

reimburse Brent one-half of that debt.

Record at 348-49.

During the marriage, Brent had a Mastercard debt of
$1,344.85.

At the time of separation, 21 months later, the debt

was $3,716.

Record at 384. At the September 3, 1996 hearing,

Brent stated that these expenses were for grocery and Christmas
expenses, both for the maintenance of the family.

Record at 384.

This debt was incurred for the benefit of both parties and for
the family.

In finding that this debt was a marital obligation,

the trial court stated that:
A significant portion of the credit card debt was
incurred after Jeanne began planning her separation in
June 1995 and are expenses which Brent would not have
incurred had he known of her plan to leave him when
housing became available.
December 10, 1996 Ruling, at 7. (Record at 325). The bulk of
this debt ($2,000) was charged during the time between Jeanne's
plan to leave the marriage in June 1995 and the separation at the
end of 1995. As the trial court stated, Brent would never have
11

incurred those debts had he known Jeanne was planning to leave
him shortly.

In such a circumstance, the court was within its

discretion to designate that debt as a marital obligation and
require Jeanne to reimburse him one-half of that expense.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S VALUATION OF BRENT LOVELESS' HOME WAS NOT A
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Jeanne challenges the trial court's finding that Brent's
home should be valued at the time of separation, rather than at
the time of trial.
The trial court's valuation of the property is a finding of
fact.

!3ee Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App.

1996) . As stated in Breinholt v. Breinholt:
The trial court's actions regarding the parties'
property interests are entitled to a presumption of
validity. Thus, the trial court's valuation of marital
property will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
discretion.
905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted).

As

with other findings of fact, "[i]f the party challenging the
finding fails to marshal the supporting evidence, the trial
court's finding will not be disturbed on appeal." Id.
Jeanne has failed to marshal the evidence.

Looking to the

merits of her claim, the trial court's decision with regard to
the valuation of the property is entitled to a presumption of
validity.

With this presumption, and considering the "clear
12

abuse of discretion" standard, the trial court's findings should
not be disturbed by this Court.
The trial court's specific finding and reasoning were stated
as:
21. Because of Jeanne's actions in applying to rent an
apartment in June 1995 and in separating in December
1995, she treated the marriage as over at that time.
It is appropriate the marriage be treated as over in
December 1995. Thus, the respective interests of the
parties in the home and other assets should be fixed as
of that date.
23. At the time of the parties separation in December
1995 the home had a value of $137,000. At the time of
trial it had a value of $140,000 (Brent's appraiser
fixed the value at trial at $137,000 and Jeanne's
appraiser fixed the value at trial at $143,000.)
December 10, 1996 Ruling, at 4. (Record at 328).
The trial court did not "clearly abuse its discretion" in
assigning a value to Brent's home.
In assigning value to marital assets, Jeanne correctly points to
a general rule. However, as stated in Morgan v. Morgan:
While the marital estate is generally valued at the
time of trial, such is not an intractable
rule.
However, the trial court's findings must be
sufficiently detailed to explain its basis for
deviating from the general rule.
854 P.2d 559, 563 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(citations
omitted)(emphasis added).
Here, the trial court abided by this admonition and made
detailed

findings regarding its decision.

Some of these

findings included the fact that Jeanne secretly treated the

13

marriage as over in June 1995 when she applied for other housing.
Record at 328.

While this is an equitable factor, another

important factor pointed to by the trial court is the relatively
short duration of the marriage.

When Jeanne decided to quit the

marriage in June 1995, the parties had been married 14 months. At
the time of separation, they had been married only 21 months.

At

the time of trial, however, in September 1996, they had been
married 30 months.

It was within the discretion of the trial

court to take these factor into consideration.

In this case,

because the trial court's findings were "sufficiently detailed to
explain its basis for deviating from the general rule" (Morgan,
854 P.2d at 563), the trial court has not committed a "clear
abuse of discretion."

Breinholt, 905 P.2d at 882.

Jeanne does make a passing challenge to the court's
"accepting the evidence of Brent Loveless' expert regarding the
value of the marital property at $137,000.00 as of the date of
separation rather than the evidence of Jeanne's expert which
fixed the value of the property at $143,000.00 at the time of
divorce."

Appellant's Brief at 12.

The trial court analyzed the

opinions of both appraisers and concluded the value to be
$140,000, a difference of $3,000 to each side.

It should be

noted that when considering testimony regarding valuation of
property, the trial court "is entitled to give conflicting
opinions whatever weight [it] deems appropriate."
Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
14

Weston v.

Here, the trial

court analyzed the two expert opinions and concluded the value of
the home to be $140,000.

Even if the trial court would have

accepted the testimony of one expert, it would have been acting
within its discretion.

There can be no abuse of discretion then,

when the trial court analyzed each expert's testimony to arrive
at a value.
A.
It was within the trial court's discretion to let Mr.
Loveless retain his premarital home.
Like the valuation of the property, the devision of property
interests is a finding which is reviewed for under the "abuse of
discretion" standard.

See Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065,

1067 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Trial courts are given "considerable

discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced
parties."

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App.

1993).
In her Brief, Jeanne refers to the $21,000 in mortgage
payments made by Brent as payments made from "marital funds."
However, the trial court's finding that the $21,000 paid by Brent
was not from marital funds is well grounded in fact and in the
record.

First, Jeanne does not deny that Brent's home was

separate property before the marriage.

Appellant's Brief at 6.

Nor does Jeanne deny that the only reason for the increase in the
value of the marital home was "due to an increase in the market
as well as the finishing of living space in the basement."
Appellant's Brief at 6.

Based on expert testimony, the trial
15

court affixed a value of $6,600 to the increased value added by
the living space.

Record at 328.

Finally, Jeanne admits that

she did not contribute any personal funds to the mortgage
payment.

Rather, he used "his wages."

Appellant's Brief at 5.

The remaining issues for the trial court were whether or not
his wages were "marital funds" and whether Jeanne's contributions
were enough to make the home a marital asset.

At trial, the

court heard testimony from Jeanne that she contributed $150
towards repairing a dishwasher (Record at 366), and that she
believed she had once deposited $180 into Brent's account (Record
at 3 68).

The parties did not commingle funds and maintained

separate checking accounts throughout the marriage.
40.

Record at

Brent was responsible for and paid for the mortgage,

utilities, taxes, and groceries.

Record at 40.

The trial court made extensive findings of fact regarding
Brent's home:
25. While Jeanne asserts an entitlement to an interest
in the home, she has not demonstrated her right to such
an entitlement because:
a)
Brent brought the home into the marriage,
b)
Brent paid for essentially all of the
improvements to the basement,
c)
Jeanne did little to improve the value of the
home other than the routine maintenance which
comes with living in the home and she
purchased and planted some flowers and she
stained the doors and moldings. In addition
Jeanne gave her son a washer, dryer and bed
in exchange for his labor.
d)
Brent paid the mortgage payments and the
utilities on the home during the marriage.
f)

The parties never commingled their incomes.
16

Brent used his income for family living
expenses. Jeanne spent her income on her car
payment, on some of the family extras such as
alcohol and Sunday dinners, occasional
allowances for the children and on family
outings. She kept for herself the rest of her
funds. Because she was able to keep a
significant
portion
of her funds,
while
Brent
paid the mortgage payments,
Jeanne does not
have a legitimate
claim to a credit
for the
mortgage payments which Brent made.
December 10, 1996 Ruling, at
added).

4-6. (Record at 326-28)(emphasis

Based on the evidence before the court in, including

bank records, and testimony at trial, the trial court had
sufficient evidence to support its findings.

In summarizing its

findings, the trial court restated that M[a]lthough it
appreciated greatly in value during the marriage, the home was a
separate asset prior to the marriage and Jeanne did little to
enhance its value."

December 10, 1996 Ruling, at

9. (Record at

323) .
In her brief, Jeanne has mis-characterized the decision and
rationale of the trial court in its decision to award Jeanne no
interest in the home.

The Appellant's Brief states:

The Trial Court did find that Jeanne did make
contributions to both the marriage and the property
including over $21,000.00 in marital income. (R. at
328). The trial court, however, claimed this was not
significant because a large portion of the house
payment went toward interest. The fact that a portion
of mortgage payments goes to interest as well as
principle is irrelevant. The payment of over
$21,000.00 was required to ^maintain and enhance' the
value of the property or it would have been lost.
Moreover, such an amount can hardly be considered
insignificant.
17

Brief of Appellant at 10.

These assertions are not at all

supported by language of the trial court's Ruling.

In its

ruling, the only thing said by the trial court regarding the
interest and principal on the mortgage is the following:
22. During the marriage the parties paid over $21,000
in house payments but because such a large share of the
payments was applied to interest, in December 1995 the
mortgage had a balance of $64,000.
December 10, 1996 Ruling, at 4. (Record at 328). Nowhere does
the trial court state that Jeanne's interest was somehow affected
by the interest and principal of the mortgage.

Further, the

trial court does not refer to such payments as "insignificant."
Later, the trial court does state that Jeanne "did little to
enhance [the home's] value." Record at 323.

In short, Jeanne

has attempted to mis-characterize the reasoning and findings of
the trial court.
Jeanne goes cites Schaumberg v. Schaumberg for the
proposition that she should be awarded "a one-half interest with
no monetary contribution to the property on her part."
Appellant's Brief at 7.

The facts of Schaumberg are clearly

distinguishable from the present case.

Schaumberg involved the

valuation and awarding of inherited property. Such is not the
case here. More significantly, the parties in Schaumberg were
married for over 25 years at the time of divorce.

In the present

case, the parties were married 14 months when Jeanne decided to
secretly arrange to leave and the marriage was 21 months old when
18

she did leave. When taken into account with the other evidence
in the record, namely the lack of commingling of funds, Brent's
major financial and emotional investment in his own house he
built, and Jeanne's failure to contribute to the property in any
significant way, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
letting Brent retain his own home free of any claim by Jeanne.
Accordingly, she was not entitled to any appreciation of the
value of the home during the time of the marriage.
POINT IV
JEANNE'S FRIVOLOUS APPEAL WARRANTS AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
The appellate courts may award attorney's fees for frivolous
appeals. See Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990).

A

frivolous appeal is defined as "one in which no justiciable
question has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as
devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever
succeed."

Id.

(citation omitted).

Here, Brent is entitled to his attorney's fees in this
appeal.

Jeanne Loveless' arguments are frivolous.

She has

failed to marshal the evidence in an attack on the trial court's
findings of fact.

There are few relevant citations to case law.

Jeanne mis-characterized the trial court's decision in valuation
of the home as one based on interest payments.

See infra, Point

III (A) . Two of the Four Points in Jeanne's appellate brief are
not supported by any citation to authority.
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Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in the final
"Point" of her Brief in which she accuses the trial court of
prejudice and "wrongful favoring."

Appellants Brief at 15.

Accordingly, Brent Loveless is entitled to his attorney's fees in
defending this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Jeanne Loveless has failed to "marshal the evidence" as
required by this Court in order to challenge findings of fact.
Thus, she should be prevented from challenging the trial court's
findings of fact.
Even if she had marshaled the evidence, the trial court's
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous nor against the great
weight of the evidence.

In fact, the trial court made extensive

and specific findings based on motions, memoranda, affidavits,
and two separate hearings which included testimony from the
parties.

It is clear from the record that the trial court's

findings were well grounded in the evidence before the court.
The trial court did not "clearly abuse its discretion" in
assigning a value to Brent's home.

While property is generally

valued at the time of trial, Utah courts have stated that this
"is not an intractable rule." Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559,
563 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

The trial court's deviation from the

general rule must be sufficiently detailed to explain the basis
its ruling.

Id. at 563. Here, the trial court made detailed and
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extensive findings in regard to the valuation of Brent's home.
The trial court correctly judged the respective interests of the
parties as of the time of separation.
The trial court acted within its discretion to allow Brent
to retain his premarital home.

The court made extensive findings

with regard to the payments made by each party toward enhancing
the value of the home.

In the short duration of the marriage,

Jeanne did little to add to the value of the home.

The payments

made by Brent were not marital payments since the parties did not
commingle their funds and Brent was separately responsible for
paying the mortgage, groceries, utilities, and tax expenses
associated with the house and the household.
Finally, Brent is entitled to his attorney's fees in this
appeal.

Jeanne Loveless' arguments are frivolous.

She has

failed the fundamental requirement to marshal the evidence in her
attack on the trial court's findings of fact.

Nowhere is this

more clearly illustrated than in the final "Point" of her Brief
in which she accuses the trial court of prejudice and "wrongful
favoring." Appellants Brief at 15.
Accordingly, it is requested that the court rule on all
issues presented, and affirm the trial court's decision and award
Brent Loveless his attorney fees on appeal.
Dated this

/Y

day of October, 1997.

~Y^
rent D . Youfng
Attorney for Plaittciff/Appellee
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isd striking his pleadings in divorce proceedjug, even if default was partially based on
jmproper ground of husband's failure to pay
mpport arrearages; default was supported
on basis of noncompliance with discovery or<fers, where husband secreted approximately
$180,000 in income while insisting to court
that he had insufficient income to pay an
additional $1,000 in support, where he never
presented required statements proving tax
payments which allegedly accounted for his
feck of funds, and where he failed to provide
documentation of several savings and investment accounts. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
87(b)(2)(C).
4 Appeal and Error <3=*961
Pretrial Procedure <s=>44.1
Trial court has broad discretion to impose discovery sanctions upon a noncomplyiag party, and Court of Appeals will not
reverse trial judge's decision to impose such
sanctions absent an abuse of that discretion.

9. Divorce e=>286(3.1)
Court of Appeals will not disturb alimony award absent a clear and prejudicial
abuse of the considerable discretion granted
the trial court in determining award.
10

**«*> m>^*
With respect to alimony award in divorc
e proceeding, trial court must consider
the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse, the ability of receiving spouse
to produce a sufficient income, and the ability
<rf supporting spouse to provide support; fail™& to consider those factors is abuse of
discretion.
-

Divorce

1L Divorce <3=»243, 286(9)
In awarding alimony in divorce proceeding, trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on each of the three prescribed factors to enable reviewing court to
ensure that trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon those
factors; if sufficient findings are not made,
reviewing court must reverse unless the record is clear and uncontroverted so as to allow
court to apply the factors as a matter of law.

5. Pretrial Procedure @=»44.1
Discovery sanctions are intended to deter misconduct and require a showing of
*fflftilness, bad faith, or fault.
12. Divorce <s=>278.1
Ex-husband did not properly marshal all
*» Pretrial Procedure <S=>44.1,46
evidence in support of trial court's findings
Striking of pleadings, entering of de- regarding value of marital property and then
*°fc, and rendering of judgment against a demonstrate insufficiency of evidence to supObedient party are the most severe of the port findings, as required when challenging
Potential discovery sanctions that can be im- those findings on appeal, where he merely
j * 8 ^ upon a nonresponding party; because
recited the findings on point and then high^verity of this type of sanction, trial lighted the evidence which he deemed con? ° ^ s r^nge of discretion is more narrow trary to the findings.
^ n when the court is imposing less severe
•auctions.
13. Appeal and Error <s=>757(3)
In order to challenge trial court's find' Divorce <3=>85
ings of facts on appeal, challenger must marJudicial system is not to be manipulated shal all the evidence in support of the findo^orce proceedings by one who actively ings and then demonstrate that the evidence
a
8gressively misleads the court and the is insufficient to support those findings;
^ ^ g party.
Court of Appeals will uphold trial court's
findings of fact if appellant fails to appropri"ivorce @»287
ately marshal all of the evidence.
demand of alimony award for findings
^ / ^ of the required factors was neces- 14. Divorce <^=>253(3)
J^^here Court of Appeals could not deWhere one party in divorce proceeding
jw, e the basis of the award or whether has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or
court abused its discretion in the otherwise acted obstructively, trial court
^ ^ of the award.
may, under its broad discretion, value the
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property at an earlier date, i.e., date of separation.
15. Divorce ®=>85, 253(3)
Trial court acted well within its discretion at divorce proceeding in valuing marital
property at time of parties' separation, as
opposed to valuing the property at the time
of trial, where husband failed to give accurate, verifiable accountings of his income and
assets.

those issues which was approved by juvenile
court, and where juvenile court order provi<j.
ed that it would be incorporated into divop^
decree and would be binding on the partis
as though entered in district court U.Cj^
1953, 78-3a-17.
21. Divorce <3=287
Court of Appeals declined to discugg
husband's claim that child support awarded
at divorce proceeding was incorrect, where
trial court was found not to have deviated
from child support guidelines. U.CJU953
78-45-7.12.

16. Divorce @=>221,287
Trial court's findings and conclusions
with respect to award of attorney fees to wife
in divorce proceeding were insufficient to 22. Divorce <£=>181
allow a meaningful review of trial court's
Court of Appeals rejected husband's reruling, though trial court found wife's attor- quest that trial judge in divorce proceeding
ney fees were "necessary," where it made no be recused from case where husband failed
finding regarding wife's need for such fees, to brief issue on appeal.
and where it also awarded substantial marital
assets to wife. U.OA.1953,30-3-3.
Fourth District, Utah County; The Honor17. Divorce ®=>226,286(9)
able Ray M. Harding.
Decision to award attorney fees in diHelen E. Christian, Gustin & Christian,
vorce action must be based upon evidence of
Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
thefinancialneed of the receiving spouse, the
Samuel King and David J. Friel, King,
ability of other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees; failure to Friel & Colton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee!
consider any of those factors is grounds for
Before DAVIS, Associate P.J., and
reversal on fee issue. U.CJL1953, 30-3-5.
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.
18* Divorce <£»287
Wife who prevailed on central issue of
OPINION
husband's appeal of divorce judgment would
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
be awarded attorney fees incurred as result
of appeal if trial court determined on reDonald R. Marshall appeals from a final
mand, following consideration of the three decree of divorce and related matters. We
required factors, that she was entitled to affirm in part and reverse in part
attorney fees for trial-level proceedings.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
19. Divorce <8=>194
Generally, when fees in divorce case are
granted to prevailing party at trial court, and
that party in turn prevails on appeal, then
fees will also be awarded on appeal.
20. Divorce <3=>312.7
District court was required on remand
to incorporate into divorce decree the juvenile court's order regarding custody and visitation, where district court had certified
those issues to juvenile court, where parties
subsequently entered into stipulation on

In June of 1992, plaintiff filed for divorce.
An order to show cause was obtained ty
plaintiff which, in pertinent part, addressri
temporary alimony and child support A
hearing was held on the matter September 1<
1992. Defendant did not attend the heart*
and, although aware of the hearing date
defendant's counsel was not present becaart
of a scheduling conflict In defendant's #
sence, the court entered an order which #«
quired that he pay $4122 per month in ctf*
support and $3500 per month in alim«#
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defendant objected to this order and requested a rehearing on*the issues. The trial
court granted defendant's request, and another hearing was held on October 7, 1992.
this second hearing resulted in a reduction
tf the child support to $3000 per month,1 but
the alimony remained at $3500. The support
payments were retroactive to August 1992.
Both parties were also ordered to refrain
from disbursing, disposing of, or encumberjog any assets without the consent of the
other.
Shortly thereafter, on December 4, 1992,
fjfarintif? obtained an order to show cause
Regarding defendant's contempt for his failire to pay the full amount of the courtfcdered support. Defendant paid plaintiff
oriy $5500 per month, instead of the required
IffiOO. In response, defendant filed a verifcd motion for relief requesting, among oth* things, that the alimony be redueed from
*8500 to $1600, retroactive to August 1992.
A hearing on those matters was held January
*> 1993. On February 1, 1993, the trial
^Jut, by memorandum decision, found there
**6 sufficient evidence to sustain the tempo^ alimony award and also found defendant
* contempt for his failure to pay the addi*AaI $1000 per month. Defendant subse?*nftyfileda motion for reconsideration or,
11
the alternative, a motion to set aside the
*b*> arguing the contempt order should be
J^ersed and the amount of alimony reduced.
J* April 5, 1993, by memorandum decision,2
7* court partially granted defendant's mo?* and vacated the finding of contempt.
*°*ever, the court again upheld the alimony
JJ^t and awarded judgment to plaintiff in
^ o u n t of $6000, reflecting the amount of
* support arrearages.
J^cause there had been allegations of
r^* the issues of child custody and visitaa ?|Were certified by the district court to the
g j ^ e court on May 19, 1993. The parties
p^quently entered into a stipulation re-

garding custody and visitation, which was
approved by the juvenile court on November
16, 1993. The custody and visitation order
provided, among other things, that plaintiff
and defendant were to have joint legal custody of the children. The order also provided
that it shall be "incorporated into the terms
of the decree of divorce, and shall be binding
on the parties to the divorce action as though
entered in the District Court, in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-17." The case
was then sent back to the district court for
resolution of the other pending issues.

ij^cndant had argued, however, that the child
ort be reduced to $2000.

3. Although plaintiff tides the "motion" an "order
to show cause," an order to show cause was
never signed by the trial court and it was treated
as a motion. This was also the case in subsequent "motions for an order to show cause."

"vr* record does not reflect that a hearing was
1
on defendant's motion for reconsideration
t an order was prepared and signed subset to the memorandum decision.

On March 10,1994, plaintiff filed a "Motion
for Order to Show Cause," s which was based
upon several grounds, including defendant's
failure to comply with discovery, his failure
to pay the additional $1000 per month in
support, and his concealment of assets.
Plaintiffs memorandum in support of her
motion alleged numerous occasions on which
defendant had failed to comply with discovery. Plaintiff requested "that defendant be
ordered, within 30 days, to completely comply with all discovery requests," that defendant be defaulted, and that he be found in
contempt of court for his failure to pay the
court-ordered support payments. Defendant
responded by denying plaintiffs allegations
and requesting immediate relief from the
$3500 per month alimony award.4 After a
hearing, the trial court entered an order on
May 27,1994, which provided in part:
6. Both parties are to provide statements
of any and all assets sold, transferred,
hypothecated or otherwise handled or disposed of from the time the divorce was
filed up to the present time. The accounts
ing should be done strictly within the normal accounting procedures, and all foundation and background documents must be

4.

Each time defendant requested a reduction in
the alimony amount, he claimed he did not have
the income to pay the court-ordered amount.
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provided to show the amounts of the sale,
to whom, the distribution of those funds
upon receipt and where they are presently
located. No further assets are to be sold
or transferred from this point on.
7. Defendant is to submit statements of
all accounts in which defendant has an
interest. Plaintiff asserts she needs discovery of more accounts than defendant
has submitted

9. All financial records from each party
are to be submitted to the other by May
20, 1994, which should include credit card
records, bank statements, canceled checks,
etc.
The court also denied defendant's request to
lower the alimony award and granted plaintiff a judgment against defendant in the
amount of $21,9555 for defendant's support
arrearages.
In June of 1994, plaintiff began garnishing
defendant's wages in an attempt to collect
the judgment Interrogatories were sent to
defendant's employer, Prudential Securities.
As a result of Prudential's answers to the
interrogatories, plaintiff discovered that although defendant had earlier disclosed that
he had a certain "Command Account" with
Prudential, he had failed to reveal that he
also had three others. Furthermore, while
defendant testified at his deposition that he
did not have any stocks with Prudential,
Prudential's interrogatory answers revealed
that he held "five groups of stock having a
face value of $58,000."
When plaintiff began garnishing defendant's wages, defendant made a partial payment in July 1994, but then stopped making
the monthly $5500 payment6 Thus, on August 19, 1994, plaintiff filed yet another motion for an order to show cause, seeking
another judgment for the support arrearages
and an order of contempt for defendant's
failure to comply with the support order, his
failure to comply with the May 27, 1994
5. This amount included the prior $6000 in arrearages which had been reduced to judgment on
April 5, 1993 and $955 interest thereon.

discovery order, and his intentional withhold,
ing of information regarding his accounts
with Prudential.
On September 9, 1994, before the August
19 motion for an order to show cause was
heard, plaintiff filed a motion for "(1) Default
on Defendant and/or (2) Obtaining Leg^
Fees to Continue Discovery and (3) Contempt." Plaintiff requested that defendant
be defaulted for his continued failure to com.
ply with discovery or, in the alternative, an
order compelling defendant to pay plaintiff
$25,000 so that she could complete discovery.
Plaintiff also requested that defendant be
found in contempt for defying the orders of
the court In plaintiff's supporting memoranda, thirteen instances of defendant's failure to provide discovery documents were
specifically outlined. Plaintiff also illustrated
how defendant had failed to comply with the
court's discovery orders.
Defendant responded to plaintiff's motions
on September 23^ 1994. Accompanying d^
fendant's response was "Defendant's Verified
Statement in Re: Expenses Paid With Defendant's 1994 Year-To-Date Income." This
document revealed that defendant had diverted $95,479.49 of his income in 1992 and
$84,077.74 in 1993 without the knowledge of
plaintiff or the court This information suggested that he did have sufficient income to
cover the additional $1000 per month he had
failed to pay since August 1,1992.
Plaintiff's August 19 and September 9 motions were heard on September 27, 1994.
Plaintiff was present with her counsel and
defendant's counsel was present The court
heard arguments of counsel; the record does
not reflect the introduction of any evidence.
As a result of the September 27, 1994
hearing, the trial court entered an order on
November 1, 1994. This order provided that
plaintiff be given a $20,000 judgment for the
support delinquencies for April 1994 through
September 1994. Paragraph three of the
order provided that because plaintiff "needs
her delinquencies paid in order to fund nec6.

Defendant's justification for this was that the
garnishment was in lieu of support payments.
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essary trial preparation, Defendant is ordered to pay his delinquencies in full, $41,849.71, by November 15, 1994, or he will be
defaulted." Defendant objected to the order,
arguing it was improper for the court to
enter an order forcing defendant to pay support arrearages or his default would be entered. The court overruled defendant's objection.

of fact and coodusions of law, but did not
enter them pending a hearing .set for January 9, 1995, on defendant's contempt and his
motion to set aside the entry of default.

[1] Apparently in response to defendant's
motion to set aside default, the trial court
filed an "Order Clarifying Default" nunc pro
tunc8 on December 19, 1994.9 This clarifying order stated that defendant's position
.As a result of defendant's failure to comply that the default was entered based on defenwith the court's November 1, 1994 order, the dant's failure to pay his delinquent support
court entered an Order of Default on Novem- was "inaccurate," and went on to say
ber 30,1994. The Order of Default provided,
3. At the hearing September 27,1994, the
in pertinent part:
Court, was persuaded, based on the PleadIn this action the Defendant . . . having
ings filed by the parties and their in-Court
been served through his counsel . . . on
arguments, that Plaintiff was unable to
September 27, 1994, with the Plaintiffs
determine the size of the marital estate.
Proposed Order on Order to Show Cause
This was because it was all in Defendant's
and on Plaintiffs Motion to Default and
control and he was hiding the assets conDefendant's Counterclaim to Reduce Suptrary to the Court's Order he disclose
port, and said Order having been entered
them. Plaintiff asked that Defendant be
by the Court November 1, 1994, . . . and
defaulted—
having not complied with paragraph 3 of
said Order, now therefore pursuant to the
terms of that Order, the Default of said
7. The Court finds that Defendant's patDefendant in the premises is hereby duly
tern in . . . (2) taking all known assets (a
minimum of $552,000.00 at the time of
entered according to law.
separation, these being solely in liquid asDefendant filed a motion to set aside the
sets held at his employer Prudential Secu*&ult on December 6, 1994, arguing the
rities), and converting them to unknown
«al court abused its discretion by entering
accounts and refusing to reveal any of
pendant's default for his failure to pay the
them to Plaintiff or the Court
Ndgment for his support delinquencies.
Without notice to defendant, an evidentia2 tearing was held on December 8, 1994,
7 ^ which the trial court received evi^ ^ in the form of testimony and exhibits
* toe merits of the divorce.7 At this time,
e
trial court signed the proposed findings
* *ule 55(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce***** Provides

9. In her Motion for Default, Plaintiff
submitted pertinent Rules and Utah case
law justifying on the spot default in such
situations.10
(Emphasis added.)
order to correct the court's earlier error in not
sufficiently stating the grounds justifying the entry of defendant's default.

Wjfter entry of the default of any party, . . . it
•oall not be necessary to give such party in
ctault any notice of action taken or to be
^^Q or to serve any notice or paper otherwise
[Squired by these rules to be served on a party
***e action or proceeding.

9. At the December 8, 1994 hearing, plaintiff suggested the court enter this nunc pro tunc order to
clarify the grounds for defendant's default. The
trial court agreed and directed plaintiff to prepare the order.

^^jUnc pro tunc order is used to "correct the
jj^r^8 omission or error." In re Estate of Leone,
^ P . 2 d 973, 978 (Utah App.1993). However, a
^ . P^o tunc order may not be used to address
t ^ e not previously before the court. Id. In
Case
. the court utilized the nunc pro tunc

10. Plaintiff's motion for default relied in part on
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which in pertinent part provides:
(2) If a party . . . fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery . . . the court in
which the action is pending may make such
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On the same day the court entered the
clarifying order, the court entered another
order captioned "order and notice of hearing"
which, in pertinent part, provided:
9. The Courts [sic] [November 1, 19U]
Order to pay delinquencies or be defaulted[] did not state the underlying reasons
for the Default Order.
10. To deal with this the Court directed
Plaintiffs counsel to submit a Clarifying
Order of Default setting forth the Court's
reasons. The Order was to include by
reference pleadings pending before the
Court on September 27, 1994, together
with the content of the Findings, Conclusions, and Decree, these all together stating the reasons underlying Defendant's
being in a position to be defaulted
(Emphasis added.) The order also provided
defendant notice of the hearing to be held on
January 9, 1995, which would address defendant's motion to set aside the default and the
entry of the findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and decree of divorce. Additionally, defendant was ordered to personally appear at
the January 9 hearing to address his contempt and the appropriate sanctions.
Although the January 9, 1995 hearing was
held as scheduled, defendant failed to appear,
citing threats on his life by plaintiff and their
son and a new job as reasons justifying his
absence. Following the January 9 hearing,
the trial court entered the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and decree of divorce
from the December 8, 1994 evidentiary proceeding and entered an order on March 6,
1995, titled "Order From Hearing Dated January 9, 1995, Re: Contempt and Other Issues." In the findings of fact supporting the
March 6 order, the trial court found, in relevant part, that: (1) defendant's consistent
position that he did not have sufficient income to pay the additional $1000 per month
was a falsehood; (2) in defiance of the court's
discovery order, defendant had steadfastly
refused to revest all of the accounts in which
he had an interest; (3) defendant had failed
to pay support since July 1, 1994; (4) defendant willfully failed to appear at the January
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and
among others the following:
'
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts
thereof, staying further proceedings until the

9, 1994 hearing without good cause; (5) "it fe
appropriate that Defendant's pleading ^
stricken if for no other reason than on the
basis of his non payment of child support?
and (6) "[t]he Court did expressly give the
Defendant the opportunity to provide discos
ery in an appropriate manner which ke
failed to do. And as a result of these things
the court felt that his default should be entered and pleadings stricken11 (Emphasis
added.) The court concluded, in relevant
part, that (1) a bench warrant should be
issued for defendant's arrest and (2) defendant's motion to set aside the default should
be denied. Accordingly, based on the find,
ings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
court ordered, in pertinent part, that Q)
"Defendant has not adequately provided discovery pursuant to Court Order and as such
it is appropriate that his pleadings be stride,
en;" and (2) that a bench warrant be issued
for defendant's arrest (Emphasis added.)
Defendant appeals.
ISSUES
[2] Defendant raises numerous issues on
appeal. Defendant first argues the trial
court did not have a legal basis to enter a
default against him and, therefore, abused its
discretion in doing so. Defendant next challenges the alimony award, asserting both
that the evidence does not support the alimony awarded to plaintiff and that the trial
court failed to make the necessaryfindingsof
fact Defendant also challenges the child
support award, claiming the amount awarded
is contrary to the Child Support Guidelines.
Defendant next alleges the trial court abused
its discretion in valuing and dividing the marital estate. Defendant argues the trial
court's award of attorney fees to plaintiff
should be reversed because the trial court
failed to make the required findings. Lastly,
defendant claims the trial court erred by not
order is obeyed, dismissing the action or pro*
ceeding or any part thereof, or rendering *
judgment by default against the disobedia*
party.
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including the provisions of the juvenile
court's order regarding custody and visitation into the divorce decree.11
ANALYSIS
A. Default
[3] Defendant claims the trial court entered his default because he failed to pay his
past due temporary support obligations. Although the court's November 1 and November 30 orders support defendant's argument,
subsequent orders demonstrate the trial
judge defaulted defendant based on his failure to comply with discovery. Furthermore,
defendant was put on notice that plaintiff was
seeking default as a sanction for defendant's
wilful noncompliance with discovery requests.
Two of plaintiffs motions, one filed on March
10,1994, and the other filed on September 9,
1994, requested that defendant be defaulted
for his failure to comply with discovery. At
the September 27, 1994 hearing, the trial
eourt heard plaintiffs September 9 motion
for default from which the order of default
arose.

complying party. Utah Dept of Transp. v.
Osguthvrpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). We
will not Teverse a trial judge's decision to
impose discovery sanctions absent an abuse
of that discretion. Arnica Mvt Ins, Co. v.
ScheMer, 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah App.1989).
Discovery sanctions are intended to deter
misconduct and require a showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault Osguihorpe, 892
P.2dat8.
[6] "The striking of pleadings, entering
of default, and rendering of judgment against
a disobedient party are the most severe of
the potential sanctions that can be imposed
upon a nonresponding party." Id. at 7. Because of the severity of this type of sanction,
'the trial court's range of discretion is more
narrow than when the court is imposing less
severe sanctions." Id. at 8.

In the case at bar, defendant secreted
approximately $180,000 of his income while
insisting to the court that he had insufficient
income to pay an additional $1000 per month
in support When defendant finally disclosed
Additionally, at the January 9, 1996 hear- what he had done, he explained the absence
ing the court stated to the parties that defen- of these funds by presenting copies of the
dant was given numerous opportunities to faces of cashier's checks purportedly sent to
comply with discovery "which he failed to the Internal Revenue Service and the State
*>" Consequently, the trial court denied of Arizona for tax liabilities. However, dePendant's motion to set aside his default fendant has never presented the statements
and reinstate his pleadings. In the March 6, evidencing payment of these obligations in
1995 order, the trial court again specifically compliance with the May 27, 1994 discovery
*kted, "Defendant has not adequately pro- order. Defendant also failed to reveal severved discovery pursuant to Court Order and al savings and investment accounts he held
88
such it is appropriate that his pleadings be with Prudential and failed to comply with the
8tri
cken." Accordingly, it is clear the trial court's Biscovery order by providing
Sounds for entering defendant's default documentation of these accounts.
^ e his failure to comply with discovery, as
^ as his failure to pay the court-ordered
[7] "[T]he judicial system is not to be
^Pport. Thus, the issue becomes whether, manipulated in divorce proceedings by one
^ e r these circumstances, the trial court who actively and aggressively misleads the
•"Used its discretion by entering the default court and the opposing party
M
Boyce v.
^ striking the pleadings.
Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980). AcThe trial court has broad discretion
impose discovery sanctions upon a non-

cordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in entering defendant's default.12

' Although the Statement of the Case section of
pendant's brief states that the propriety of the
P^ch warrant is also on appeal, it is not menanywhere else in the brief. Thus, because
t^
issue was not briefed, we do not address it.
n "^uc was iiui ui icicu, wc uu in_»i auuicaa it.

12. Although the trial court may have erroneously
entered defendant's default partially based on his
failure to pay support arrearages, we may affirm
based on the fact that the default was also sup-

7? State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App.
^2).
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B. Alimony Award

[8-11] Defendant also challenges the alimony award, claiming the trial court failed to
enter the required findings. We will not
disturb a trial court's alimony award absent a
clear and prejudicial abuse of the considerable discretion granted the trial court in determining the award. BreinhoU v. BreinhoU,
905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App.1995). It is well
grounded in Utah law that the trial court
must consider: " *(1) the financial conditions
and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a
sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the
supporting spouse to provide support.'"
Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah
App.1993) (citation omitted). A trial court
abuses its discretion when it fails to consider
the enumerated factors. WiLley v. Wittey,
866 F2d 547, 550 (Utah App.1993). "Thus,
'the trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on each factor to enable a
reviewing court to ensure that the trial
court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon'" the required factors.
Id (citation omitted). Accordingly, " *[i]f sufficient findings are not made, we must reverse unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such as to allow us to apply the . . .
factors as a matter of law on appeal'" Id
(citation omitted).
After reviewing the trial court's findings
on alimony, we find them to be "so inadequate that we cannot determine the legal
basis of the award or whether the trial court
abused its discretion in the amount of the
award." BeU v. BeU> 810 P2d 489,493 (Utah
App.1991). Thus, "we reverse and remand
ported on the basis of defendant's noncompliance
with the discovery orders. See generally, DeBry v.
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (may affirm
on any proper basis even though trial court's ruling
was based on other ground); State ex rel. H.R.V. <fr
BJ>.V., 906 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App.1995) (same).
13. This notwithstanding defendant's evidentiary
contribution to the fact finding process.
14. We note defendant's argument that the trial
court erred in valuing the marital property at the
time of the parties' separation. "However,

the alimony award for additional findings or
each of the . . . [required] factors . . . , and i
reassessment of the alimony award basec
upon those findings[,]" if necessary. Id
C. Property Division
[12-15] Defendant argues the trial court
abused its discretion in valuing and dividing
the marital estate. The trial court entered
findings regarding the value of the marital
property, which defendant now claims are m
error.13 However, in order to challenge a
trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the
challenger "must marshal all the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate
that the evidence is insufficient to support
the findings in question." Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n. 1 (Utah App.
1995) (emphasis added). We will uphold the
trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to
appropriately marshal all of the evidence.
Mired v. Broum, 893 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah
App.1995). Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence but has merely recited
the findings on point and then highlighted
the evidence which he deems contrary to the
findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb the
trial court's findings and affirm the awards
on appeal.14
D. Plaintiffs Attorney Fees
[16,17] Defendant claims the trial court
erred in ordering him to pay plaintiffs attoi>
ney fees because the court failed to consider
defendant's ability to pay and plaintiffs need
for the award. The trial court has the authority to award attorney fees in a divorce
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3
(1995). However, the decision to make such
where one party has dissipated an asset hidden
its value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the
trial court may, under its broad discretion, value
the property at an earlier date, i.e., separation."
Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App.
1987). Defendant has acted obstructively in the
case at bar by failing to give accurate, verifiable
accountings of his income and assets. Thus, it
was well within the trial court's discretion tt>
value the property at the time of the parties
separation, as opposed to valuing the property at
the time of trial. See Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876
P.2d 429, 432-33 (Utah App. 1994).
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ID award " "must be based on evidence of the case are granted to the prevailing party at
financial need of the receiving spouse, the the trial court, and that party in turn prevails
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on
reasonableness of the requested fees.'" Wil- appeal. BeU v. BeU, 810 PJ2d 489, 494 (Utah
ley v. WiUey, 866 PJ2d 547, 555 (Utah App. App.1991). In this case, if the trial court
1993) (quoting BeU v. BeU, 810 P.2d 489, 493 determines that plaintiff is still entitled to
(Utah App.1991)). The failure to consider
attorney fees after considering the above
any of the enumerated factors is ground for
enumerated factors, because she prevailed on
reversal on the fee issue. See id at 556;
Rvdrrum v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah the central issue on appeal, the entry of
defendant's default, she shall be awarded her
App.1991).
attorney fees incurred as a Tesult of this
The trial court entered the following find- appeal. See id This amount shall be detering of fact regarding attorney fees:
mined on remand.
Plaintiffs fees and costs were submitted
by ledger . . . to the court in the total sum
E. Failure to Incorporate Juvenile
of $25344.88. Plaintiffs attorney . . . was
Court's Order
sworn and testified concerning the fees.
He testified that his hourly charge was
[20] Lastly, defendant takes issue with
$120.00, his associate . . . $100.00, that
the failure of the district court to incorporate
those were reasonable and customary, and
most were incurred in efforts to have De- into the divorce decree the juvenile court's
fendant reveal his finances. The Court order regarding custody and visitation.
finds under all circumstances including the Plaintiff agrees with defendant's position to
partiesr] ability to pay and Defendant's the effect that crucial language regarding
demonstrated pattern of conduct, that joint custody and ongoing counseling was
Plaintiffs fees and costs are reasonable omitted. Accordingly, we remand the issue
and necessary in full, and awards Plaintiff to the district court so that the order of the
judgment for fees and costs against the juvenile court can be incorporated into the
Defendant in the sum of $25,844.88.
divorce decree.
(Emphasis added.)
Although the trial court concludes that
Pontiffs attorney fees were "necessary,"
^ere is no finding regarding plaintiffs need
for an award of attorney fees. As a result,
*efindingsand conclusions are insufficient
fo allow a meaningful review of the trial
Cour ,
t s ruling, especiaUy in the face of the
**ard of substantial marital assets. See WU** 866 P.2d at 555 (" We have consistently
ei
*couraged trial courts to make findings to
^Plain the factors which they considered
Levant in arriving at an attorney fee
**ard.'") (citation omitted). We therefore
^erse the attorney fees award to plaintiff
^ remand for the entry of further findings
distent with this opinion.
^8,19] Plaintiff requests attorney fees
appeal. Generally, when fees in a divorce

CONCLUSION
[21,22] We conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in entering defendant's default. As a result, the evidentiary
hearing conducted on December 8, 1994, and
the entry of the findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and decree of divorce were proper.
Furthermore, because defendant did not
marshal all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings regarding the valuation
and division of the marital property, this
court will not disturb the trial court's findings on appeal. We remand the issue of
alimony for the entry of further findings.
We also remand to the trial court for findings
on the issue of plaintiffs need for attorney
fees and, if appropriate, the determination of
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plaintiffs attorney fees on appeal Lastly,
we remand so the juvenile court's order may
be incorporated in the divorce decree.15

15. Defendant also claimed that the child support
amount was incorrect. However, after reviewing defendant's argument, we find the trial court
did not deviate from the child support guidelines,
see Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp.1995),
and accordingly, find defendant's claim to be
without merit. Thus, we decline to discuss it on
appeal. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303
(Utah 1992).

GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
C O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

We also reject defendant's argument that
plaintiffs brief should be stricken for failure to
comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Finally, we reject defendant's request that
Judge Harding be recused from the case because
defendant failed to brief the issue on appeal. See
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Am>
1992).
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Final decree of divorce granting alimony, child support, visitation rights and
property division was entered in the Fourth
District Court, Utah County, Dennis L.
Draney, J., and husband appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Russon, J., held that (1)
award of alimony to wife was supported by
evidence; (2) husband failed to produce sufficient evidence to challenge award of child
support; (3) visitation award was not unreasonable; (4) award to wife of automobile owned by husband's corporation was
equitable; (5) award to wife of husband's
premarital property was equitable; (6) evidence supported finding with respect to
equitable interest in marital home; (7) wife
was entitled to costs; (8) husband was not
entitled to new trial; and (9) wife was
entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
Affirmed.
1. Divorce <S=>235, 286(3)
In formulating alimony awards, trial
court has broad discretion and its decision
will not be overturned absent abuse of
discretion or manifest injustice.
2. Divorce <*»237
In awarding alimony, trial court must
consider financial condition and need of
receiving spouse; ability of receiving
spouse to produce sufficient income for him
or herself; and ability of responding
spouse to provide support.
3. Divorce <*»24<K2)
Award to wife of $2,000 per month
alimony, reduced to $1,500 per month after
minor child in custody of wife began
school, was justified where parties had
agreed that wife would remain home to

care for minor child, and court found that
husband had ability to provide support at
that level.
4. Divorce <*»307, 312.5
Husband could not successfully challenge finding with respect to child support
calculation where he failed to marshal all
evidence supporting court's ^finding and
failed to demonstrate that evidence was
insufficient to support finding.
5. Divorce *»299
Visitation schedule, including alternate
weekends with return before Sunday morning church services, alternate Wednesday
evening visits, summer vacation periods,
and alternate holidays, was not unreasonable to deny husband sufficient basis to
preserve relationship with minor child, and
was not abuse of discretion.
6. Divorce *»252.3(1)
Wife was entitled to award of car as
marital asset, although car was owned by
husband's corporation during marriage;
corporation was to be viewed as husband's
alter ego where husband was sole shareholder in corporation, included corporation's automobile as personal assets on individual financial statements, and routinely
conducted personal business in corporate
capacity, and recognition of corporate entity would result in inequity as wife had
been principal operator of car during marriage and husband was awarded three remaining automobiles used by couple.
7. Divorce <S=>252.3(3)
Division of marital property was equitable, although wife received certain
household items belonging to husband before marriage, where husband received certain household items belonging to wife before marriage and ultimate property division was fair and equitable.
8. Divorce «»278
Husband could not successfully challenge finding on equity interest in marital
home where he failed to marshal evidence
in support of finding and then demonstrate
that, even viewing evidence in light most
favorable to finding, evidence was insufficient to support it
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9. Time &*M2)
Wife was entitled to five days, exclusive of intermediate Saturday and Sunday,
to mail copy of cost memorandum to husband and file copy with court, to be eligible
for costs. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 5(bXl),
6(a), 54(dX2).

property division. We affirm the trial
court's ruling, but remand for a determination of reasonable attorney fees to be
awarded Mrs. Watson on appeal.
I. FACTS

The Watsons were married in Springville,
Utah on July 28, 1984. On February 12,
1990, Mrs. Watson filed a complaint for
divorce, which was granted on March 18,
1991, The parties stipulated that Mrs.
Watson would be awarded custody of the
minor child subject to reasonable visitation
by Mr. Watson. Mrs. Watson was awarded
alimony in the amount of $2000 per month
from October 1990 through September
1992, and $1,500 per month thereafter until
such time as Mrs. Watson remarried, co11. Divorce <*»183
Record on husband's motion for new habited or died. She was further awarded
trial in divorce action failed to establish child support in the amount of $660 per
impropriety on part of wife's attorney, al- month. The court also made an extensive
though husband claimed that attorney property division between the parties.
caused bank to increase his monthly ban
Mr. Watson appeals the divorce decree,
obligation.
claiming that the trial court erred: (1) in
determining alimony; (2) in determining
12. Divorce «=»lf4
Wife was entitled to award of attorney child support; (3) in determining Mr. Watfees on appeal where she was awarded son's visitation rights with the minor child;
attorney fees below and prevailed on ap- (4) in awarding Mrs. Watson a vehicle
owned by the corporation that employed
peal.
Mr. Watson, as well as awarding Mrs. Watson certain property owned by Mr. Watson
Wayne B. Watson, pro se.
prior to the marriage; (5) in computing the
Craig M. Snyder and Leslie W. Slaugh* respective parties' equity in the residence
and real property; (6) in awarding costs to
Provo, for plaintiff and appellee;
Mrs- Watson; and (7) in denying Mr. Wat*
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and son's motion for a new trial based upon
RUSSON, JJ.
alleged inappropriate Jtehavior of Mrs. Watson's counsel. Mrs. Watson seeks attorney
AMENDE? OPINION UPON
1
fees
on appeal.
REHEARING
RUSSON, Judjre:
II. ANALYSIS
Wayne Watson appeals the district
court's decree of divorce with respect to
We address Mr. Watson's claims in the
alimony, child support, visitation rights and order outlined above.*
10. Divorce <&»192
Wife was entitled to deposition costs
where trial court was persuaded that depositions were taken in good faith and reasonably necessary to case at bar, and husband
failed to include depositions as part of
record, so that Court of Appeals could not
determine whether wife could have
achieved discovery through less expensive
methods. Rules App.Proc., Rule ll(eX2),

1. This opinion replaces the opinion of the same
name issued July 2, 1992. The sole change is
the addition of .section H, "Attorney Fees on
Appeal."
2. In the case at bar, Mr. Watson does not comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure which sets forth the appellant's briefing requirements in this court Specifically, Mr.

Watson does not supply this court with the
appropriate standards of review for the issues
raised, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(5). Moreover, he
does not include a statement of facts supported
by citations to the record in accordance with
Rule 24(a)(7). "We remind counsel that it is
our prerogative to affirm the lower court decision solely on the basis of failure to comply
with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure."
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A. Alimony
[1,2] Mr. Watson claims that the trial
court erred in awarding Mrs. Watson permanent alimony. In formulating alimony
awards, the trial court has broad discretion,
and its decisions will not be overturned
absent an abuse of discretion or manifest
injustice. See Schindler v. Schindler, 776
P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App.1989). In Schindler,
this court outlined the factors to be considered by a trial court in determining alimony:
In awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial court to consider each of
the following three factors: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce a sufficient income for
him or herself; and (3) the ability of the
responding spouse to provide support.
If these three factors have been considered, we will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion. The ultimate
test of an alimony award is whether the
party receiving alimony will be able to
support him or herself "as nearly as possible at the standard of living ... enjoyed during the marriage." English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977).
Id. (citations omitted).
[3] With respect to Mrs. Watson's financial condition and her ability to produce
income, the court found, based upon the
evidence at trial, that Mrs. Watson did not
work outside the home, and in fact, there
was an "agreement by the parties that
[Mrs. Watson] would not work outside the
home but would remain in the home to care
for the parties' minor child." Therefore,
the court "decline[d] to impute any income
to the plaintiff, at least until the child is in
school on a full time basis." With respect
to Mr. Watson's ability to provide support,
the court found, based on the parties' tax
returns from 1986 to 1990, that Mr. Watson
had an average gross income of $93,668.75.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 ?2d
1311, 1313 n. 1 (Utah App.1991) (citations omitted). However, we decline, in this instance, to
837 P.26—2

Accordingly, the court entered the following finding:
Based upon [Mr. Watson's] ability to
earn, and the needs of [Mrs. Watson],
the Court awards alimony to [Mrs. Watson] in the amount of $2000.00 per
month, beginning with the month of October 1990, through and including the
month of September 1992. Said alimony
payments may be paid in two equal
monthly installments of $1000.00 each
due on the 5th and 20th days of October,
1990 and continuing thereafter through
and including September of 1992, when
the parties' minor child is scheduled to
become enrolled in school on a full time
basis.
Beginning with the month of October,
1992, [Mrs. Watson's] alimony award
shall be reduced to the sum of $1,500.00
per month
Said alimony payments shall continue
until such time as the plaintiff remarries,
dies or cohabits as defined by statute, or
until further order of the court
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court's written findings demonstrate that the court considered the factors
set out in Schindler, and those findings are
supported by the evidence. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining the alimony
award.
B. Child Support
[4] Mr. Watson argues that the trial
court erred in calculating the child support
award. In reviewing child support awards,
"we accord substantial deference to the
trial court's findings and give it considerable latitude in fashioning the appropriate
relief." Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d
393, 394 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted).
"We will not disturb that court's actions
unless the evidence clearly preponderates
to the contrary or there has been an abuse
of discretion." Id
exercise our discretion to affirm solely on the
basis that Mr. Watson failed to comply with
Rule 24(a)(5) and (7). See id.
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Specifically, Mr. Watson argues that the
trial court failed to offset his child support
obligation by the amount that he pays in
medical and dental premiums for the minor
child, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 7845-7.7(2Xb) (1992), which directs the trial
court to:
Calculate each parent's proportionate
share of the base combined child support
obligation by multiplying the combined
child support obligation by each parent's
percentage of combined adjusted gross
income, and subtracting from the products the children's portion of any monthly payments made directly by each parent for medical and dental insurance premiums.
To mount a successful challenge to the
trial court's finding with respect to the
child support calculation, Mr. Watson is
required to marshal all the evidence supporting the court's finding and demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to
support that finding. See Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Mr. Watson fails to satisfy that burden in
the present case. Therefore, we assume
the record supports the finding, Crouse v.
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App.1991),
and conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in setting the child
support award.
C. Visitation
[5] Mr. Watson argues the trial court
erred in determining his visitation rights
with the minor child. Specifically, he contends that the court improperly restricted
his "normal" visitation rights by ordering
that he return the minor child to Mrs. Watson one-half hour prior to church services
at the conclusion of his alternating weekend visitation.
"In determining visitation rights, the trial court must 'give the highest priority to
the welfare of the children over the desires
of the parent'" Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744
P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah App.1987), cert denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) (quoting
Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah
1980)). Accordingly, we will disturb the
trial court's visitation determination only

upon a showing that the trial court has
abused its discretion. See Moon v. Moon,
790 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah App.1990); Ebbert, 744 P.2d at 1023.
We have previously noted that the trial
court's visitation schedule "should be realistic and reasonable and provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering
the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent" Ebbert, 744 P.2d at 1022. In
the present case, the trial court awarded
Mr. Watson the following visitation with
the minor child:
(a) Alternating weekends from Friday
at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday morning thirty
minutes prior to the start of plaintiffs
church meeting.
(b) During the week that the defendant does not have weekend visitation,
Wednesday evening from 5:30 p.m. until
8:30 p.m.
(c) Christmas holiday beginning each
Christmas day from 1:00 p.m. for one
half of the total Christmas holiday vacation period.
(d) One two-week period and one oneweek period during each summer vacation period.
(e) Father's Day.
(f) Alternate state and national holidays, except for Christmas Day which is
dealt with separately hereinabove.
Mr. Watson does not demonstrate that
the foregoing visitation schedule is unreasonable as to deny him a sufficient basis to
preserve his relationship with the minor
child. Further, the court's order which requires Mr. Watson to return the child so
that he may attend his regular church
meetings is not so unreasonable as to
amount to an abuse of discretion by the
trial court Therefore, we conclude that
the district court did not err in determining
Mr. Watson's visitation rights.
D. Property Division
Mr. Watson claims that the trial court
erred in awarding Mrs. Watson the 1985
BMW automobile which was owned by the
corporation that employed him. He further claims that the trial court erred in
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awarding Mrs. Watson certain personal
property that was his premarital property.
'There is no fixed formula upon which to
determine a division of properties in a divorce action[.]" Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751
P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App.1988) (citation
omitted). We afford the trial court "considerable latitude in adjusting financial and
property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, changes will
be made in a trial court's property division
determination in a divorce action "only if
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly
preponderated against the findings, or such
a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Id. (citations omitted).
1. Corporate Property
[6] Mr. Watson claims that the trial
court erred in awarding Mrs. Watson the
BMW automobile on the ground that it was
not subject to marital distribution because
it was a non-marital asset owned by the
corporation that employed him. Mrs. Watson responds that the unity of interest between Mr. Watson and his solely owned
corporation requires that the latter be
viewed as the alter ego of the former for
purposes of this action. We agree.
In Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782
(Utah App.1987), we set out the requirements for setting aside a corporate entity
under the alter ego doctrine.
To disregard the corporate entity under the equitable alter ego doctrine, two
circumstances must be shown: (1) Such a
unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist, but
the corporation is, instead, the alter ego
of one or a few individuals; and (2) if
observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or result
in an inequity.
Id at 786 (citations omitted).
The record in this case demonstrates that
the two requirements set forth in Colman
are satisfied. First, there was a unity of

interest between Mr. Watson and the professional corporation that employed him.
Mr. Watson was the sole shareholder in the
corporation and regularly purchased automobiles in his corporate name for the couple's personal use. Further, Mr. Watson
included the corporation's automobiles as
personal assets on his individual financial
statements. Finally, there was substantial
evidence at trial that Mr. Watson routinely
conducted personal business in his corporate capacity. Therefore, the first prong
under Colman is satisfied.
Second, recognition of the corporate entity would result in an inequity in the case at
bar. The record demonstrates that the
BMW was purchased during the couple's
marriage, that Mrs. Watson had been the
principle operator of the BMW during the
marriage, and that the trial court awarded
the three remaining automobiles used by
the Watsons to Mr. Watson. Based on
those facts, an inequity would result since
Mr. Watson, or the corporation in which he
is the sole shareholder, would be awarded
all of the automobiles possessed by Mr. and
Mrs. Watson during their marriage. Thus,
we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the
automobile was subject to equitable distribution in this action.
2. Premarital Property
[7] Mr. Watson argues that the trial
court erred in awarding his premarital
property to Mrs. Watson. Specifically, he
challenges the award of certain household
furniture, garden tools, a washer and
dryer, and his premarital contribution to
the couple's Nomad trailer.
"Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be viewed as separate property,
and in appropriate circumstances, equity
will require that each party retain the separate property brought to the marriage.
However, the rule is not invariable."
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah
1987) (footnotes omitted).
In appropriate circumstances, one
spouse may be awarded property which
the other spouse brought in to the marriage. The rationale behind this excep-
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tion to the general rule is that "[m|arital
property 'encompasses all of the assets
of every nature possessed by the parties,
whenever obtained and from whatever
source derived/ " Sorensen v. Sorensen,
769 P.2d 820, 824 (Utah App.1989) (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076,
1078 (Utah 1988)), and that the trial court
may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property equitably regardless of its source or time of acquisition.
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424
n. 1 (Utah App.1990) (citations omitted).
Additionally, we have held that in dividing
property between parties in a divorce action, "[t]he overriding consideration is that
the ultimate division be equitablef.]" Burt
v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App.
1990) (quoting Newmeyer v. Newmeyer,
745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987)).
In the present case, the trial court made
a detailed property division between the
parties that spans approximately six pages.
In challenging the court's findings, Mr.
Watson does not challenge the equity of
the division, but only challenges the propriety of including his individual premarital
items in the property division. Specifically,
Mr. Watson challenges the court's award
of certain household furniture, garden
tools, and a washer and dryer to Mrs. Watson. However, Mr. Watson disregards the
fact that the trial court, pursuant to its
equitable powers, also awarded to him certain premarital property belonging to Mrs.
Watson, including a microwave oven, an
iron, and a vacuum. Accordingly, because
the court's Ultimate property division was
fair and equitable, we determine that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by
including certain premarital property of
each party in its distribution.
Further, Mr. Watson contends that the
trial court erred in awarding the Nomad
trailer to Mrs. Watson because the trial
court failed to consider his premarital contribution to the purchase of the trailer m
arriving at its ultimate division. However,
Mr. Watson cites no evidence whatsoever
to support this allegation. Moreover, there
was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to
support the trial court's finding that the

Nomad trailer was marital property subject
to equitable distribution between the parties. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding the Nomad
Trailer to Mrs. Watson.
E. Equity Interest In Home
[8] Mr. Watson challenges the trial
court's finding with respect to the amount
of his equity interest in the parties' home.
Specifically, he claims that the trial court,
in its calculation, did not consider his contribution of $60,549 that he withdrew from
his retirement account and secured with a
third mortgage on the home. Mrs. Watson
responds that the money withdrawn from
the retirement account was not used for
construction of the home, and that therefore she should not be held responsible for
any portion of the obligation under the
third mortgage. The court found:
Defendant claims, but has not shown,
that he withdrew funds from his retirement account and the proceeds of the
third mortgage referred to above went
into the house, but defendant has made
no showing that such is the case, and the
court determines that the plaintiff should
not be held responsible for the third
mortgage to which she did not agree.
"Findings of fact . . . shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). Moreover, we have held:
To mount a successful attack on the
trial court's factual findings, an appellant must marshal all the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings and
then demonstrate that, even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to
the findings, the evidence is insufficient
to support the findings, Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985),
or that its findings are otherwise clearly
erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous, when, even though there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court is "left
with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed." State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 198 (Utah 1987).
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Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88
(Utah App.1989).
Not only has Mr. Watson failed to marshal the evidence in support of the above
finding and then demonstrate that, even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, the evidence is insufficient to support it, but Mr. Watson
erroneously claims that the uncontroverted
testimony before the trial court was that
he used the funds from his retirement account to construct the parties' home. In
fact, Mrs. Watson testified before the court
that Mr. Watson did not use money from
his pension account for construction of the
home. Therefore, since there was sufficient evidence to support the court's finding, we conclude that the finding was not
clearly erroneous.
F. Costs
[9] Mr. Watson argues that the trial
court erred in awarding costs to Mrs. Watson. "We review the trial court's award of
costs under an abuse of discretion standard." Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684,
686 (Utah App.1990) (citing Frampton v.
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980);
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App.
1988)).
Specifically, Mr. Watson argues that
costs were improperly awarded since Mrs.
Watson failed to comply with Rule 54(dX2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He
further argues that the trial court erred in
awarding deposition costs to Mrs. Watson.
The pertinent portion of Rule 54(dX2)
states:
The party who claims his costs must
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party
against whom costs are claimed, a copy
of a memorandum of the items of his
costs and necessary disbursements in the
action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stat3. The pertinent portion of Rule 5(b)(1) provides:
Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney the service shall
be made upon the attorney unless service
upon the party himself is ordered by the

ing that to affiant's knowledge the items
are correct, and that the disbursements
have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding.
The record in this case reflects that Mrs.
Watson complied with the terms of Rule
54(d)(2). Under that rule, Mrs. Watson had
five days after entry of judgment within
which to serve a copy of the memorandum
of costs upon Mr. Watson, and file a verified memorandum with the court However, Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that "[w]hen the period
of time prescribed or allowed is less than
seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in
the computation." Accordingly, Mrs. Watson had five days after March 20, 1991, the
day judgment was entered, exclusive of the
intermediate Saturday and Sunday, to comply with Rule 54(d)(2). Mrs. Watson mailed
a copy of the memorandum to Mr. Watson's attorney, as per Rule 5(bXl) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,8 and filed a
verified memorandum with the court on
March 26, 1990, which date was within the
prescribed time limit. Therefore, Mrs.
Watson complied with rule 54(d)(2), and is
not barred from costs under that rule.
[10] Mr. Watson further challenges the
award of deposition costs. Costs of depositions are not recoverable unless "the trial
court is persuaded that they were taken in
good faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the
development and presentation of the case."
Morgan, 795 P.2d at 687 (quoting Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774) (citation omitted). In
Morgan, we further provided that:
[T]he party seeking the cost of deposition
bears the burden of proving that the
depositions were reasonably necessary.
Depositions are reasonably necessary
only where the complex nature of the
case prevents a party from completing
discovery through less expensive methcourt. Service upon the attorney or upon a
party shall be made by delivering a copy to
him or by mailing it to him at his known
address
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Mr. Watson's argument is without merit
ods such as interrogatories, requests for
admissions, and requests for the produc- In an affidavit filed with the district court,
Vera Bailey, Executive Vice President of
tion of documents.
Wasatch
Bank, stated that "Mr. Watson's
Id (citation omitted).
loan
account
with Wasatch Bank was treatThe trial court was persuaded that the
ed
no
differently
than any other delinquent
depositions were taken in good faith and
loan
account."
In
support of the bank's
reasonably necessary to the case at bar.
treatment
of
Mr.
Watson's
loan account,
In ruling on Mr. Watson's Motion to Strike
Costs, the court specifically found that "the Mr. Bailey cited the following factors:
costs set forth [in Mrs. Watson's Memoran(a) The fact that the loan was unsedum of Costs] were reasonable and necescured and had been renewed on three
sary for development and presentation of
previous occasions and had never been
the case." Further, because Mr. Watson
paid in full and was now delinquent;
failed to include the depositions as part of
(b) The fact that Mr. Watson did not
the record pursuant to Rule ll(eX2) of the
respond
to the bank's collection efforts
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,4 we
until the loan became seriously past due;
must presume that the trial court's finding
(c) The fact that the Watsons' domesthat Mrs. Watson's costs were reasonable
tic
problems were common knowledge
and necessary was supported by the eviand in many divorces there are often
dence. See Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d
negative financial problems resulting
998, 1002 (Utah App.), cert denied, 776
from divorce; and
P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Finally, without the
depositions as a point of reference, this
(d) On October 12, 1990, Mr. Watson
court cannot determine whether Mrs. Watinformed [Mr. Bailey] that he had withson could have achieved discovery through
drawn his major deposits from Wasatch
less expensive methods such as interrogaBank.
tories, requests for admissions, and reSince Mr. Watson does not establish any
quests for the production of documents.
impropriety on the part of Mrs. Watson's
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
attorney, the trial court did not abuse its
court did not abuse its discretion in awarddiscretion in denying his motion for a new
ing costs to Mrs. Watson.
trial.
G. Motion For New Trial
[11] Lastly, Mr. Watson argues that
the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a new trial. Specifically, he contends
that the trial court should have ordered a
new trial because Mrs. Watson's, attorney
caused Mr. Watson's lender, Wasatch
Bank, to increase his monthly loan obligation by fourfold. "In reviewing a court's
denial of a motion for a new trial, the
ruling on such a motion will be disturbed
on appeal 'only for an abuse of discretion.' " Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744,
74T (Utah App.1991) (quoting Erickson v.
Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323, 1326
(Utah App.1990)) (citation omitted).
4. Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides:
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal
that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by

H. Attorney Pees On Appeal
[12] Mrs. Watson seeks an award of
attorney fees on appeal. "Ordinarily, when
fees in a divorce have been awarded below
to the party who then prevails on appeal,
fees will also be awarded to that party on
appeal/' Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494
(Utah App.1991) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.1990)). In the
case at bar, Mrs. Watson was awarded
attorney fees below and has prevailed on
appeal. Further, Mr. Watson has not demonstrated why we should diverge from the
general rule; therefore, we award Mrs.
Watson reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant
shall include in the record a transcript of all
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. ,
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CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in: (1) determining Mrs. Watson's alimony award;
(2) determining the child support award; (3)
determining Mr. Watson's visitation rights;
(4) awarding Mrs. Watson the 1985 BMW
and certain premarital property owned by
Mr. Watson; (5) computing the parties' respective equity in the home; (6) awarding
costs to Mrs. Watson; and (7) denying Mr.
Watson's motion for a new trial. Additionally, we award Mrs. Watson attorney fees
on appeal in an amount to be determined
by the trial court on remand.
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
fO

1. Arrest <*=*8<4)
Stopping of automobile and consequent
detention of its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the Fourth Amendment even
though the purpose of stop is limited and
resulting detention quite brief. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
2. Arrest *»58
Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable seizures.
U.S.CA. Const
Amend. 4.
3. Arrest *»63.4(1)
To determine whether seizure is reasonable, court must determine whether police officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether officer's action was
reasonably related in scope to circumstances which justified interference in first
place. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM/

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Pamela Malan HIGGINS, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 910622-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 25, 1992.

Defendant was convicted on guilty
plea in the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Pat B. Brian, J., of attempted possession of controlled substance. Defendant appealed denial of her motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals,
Russon, J., held that defendant was not
unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, and evidence obtained in
search incident to her arrest was admissible.
Affirmed.
Jackson, J., dissented.

4. Arrest «=»63.5(6)
Stopping of automobile if constitutionally justified if stop is based upon reasonable and articulable suspicion that occupant
of automobile has committed or is about to
commit a crime. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4.
5. Arrest *=»63.5(6)
Stop of automobile was constitutionally justified where automobile matched description of vehicle suspected in reported
gas theft at nearby convenience store.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
6. Arrest «=>63.5(9)
Length and scope of detention pursuant to stop of automobile must be strictly
tied to and justified by circumstances
which rendered initiation of detention permissible. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
7. Arrest <8=»63.5(6, 9)
Defendant was not unreasonably
seized pursuant to initial stop of automobile in which she was passenger, where
police officers stopped automobile to question driver about gas theft and did not ask
defendant any questions, demand to see
her identification, or restrict her liberty in
any way. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4.
8. Arrest <*=»68(4)
Defendant was not seized when police
officers approached her to ask if she would
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^Associate C.J., HOWE, J., and DURHAM,
jk concur in RUSSON, J., opinion.
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Steven Neil BREINHOLT, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Jan £. BREINHOLT, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 940395-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 26, 1995.
In divorce proceeding, the Seventh District Court, Carbon County, Lyle R.
Anderson, J., granted divorce and awarded
child support and alimony to wife. Wife
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davis, Associate P.J., held that: (1) trial court failed to
enter sufficient findings of fact regarding
Parties'financialneeds and failed to consider
husband's income from his second job and
Parties' unearned income when calculating
alimony award; (2) sufficient findings of fact
*egarding necessary business expenses were
*e(juired to determine child support; and (3)
Valuation of business was not warranted.
Reversed and remanded in part, and
ffirmed in part.

a

1

Divorce <S=»235, 286(3.1)
, Trial courts have considerable discretion
* determining alimony and will be upheld on
T>Peal unless clear and prejudicial abuse of
a,8cr
etion is demonstrated.
*• Divorce @»286(1)
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's
^clugiou of law with respect to alimony
^s^ds for correctness, according no defer*** to trial court.

3. Divorce <&»286(6.1)
If Court of Appeals reviews trial court's
findings of fact with respect to alimony
awards, Court will reverse only if findings
are clearly erroneous.
4. Divorce «»237
When determining alimony, trial court
must consider financial conditions and needs
of receiving spouse, ability of receiving
spouse to support him or herself, and ability
of payor spouse to provide .support
5. Divorce ^=>237
When determining alimony, payor
spouse's ability to provide support depends
on payor spouse's reasonable financial needs.
6. Divorce <&»239, 286(6.1)
When determining alimony, trial court is
required to enter sufficient findings on financial conditions and needs of receiving spouse,
ability of receiving spouse to support himself
and ability of payor spouse to provide support; if it fails to do so, Court of Appeals will
reverse unless relevant facts contained within record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only finding in favor of
judgment.
7. Divorce <S=>239
When determining propriety of alimony,
trial court should have entered findings regarding each party's financial needs and the
reasonableness of each party's monthly expenses, as well as any personal expenditures
paid by payor spouse's business, since assessment of financial need was required to assess
payor spouse's ability to provide support
8. Divorce <£»240(2)
Trial court was required to consider income from husband's second job in its alimony calculations, even though he was appointed to that position only six months before
parties separated.
9. Divorce @=»240(2)
Trial court must consider both parties'
unearned income when fashioning alimony
award, since it affects payor spouse's ability
to provide support, as well as receiving
spouse's need.
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10. Divorce <3=>286(2)
Trial court is afforded considerable discretion in adjusting financial interests of divorced parties and court's actions are entitled to presumption of validity.
11. Parent and Child @=>3.3(10)
Court of Appeals will not reverse child
support determination absent manifest injustice or inequity that indicates clear abuse of
discretion.
12. Parent and Child @=>3.3(10)
Trial court is required to enter detailed
and specific findings on all material issues
which must be considered when making child
support award; if it fails to do so, Court of
Appeals will reverse unless facts in record
are clear, uncontroverted and capable of supporting only finding in favor of judgment
13. Parent and Child ^3.3(6)
When determining child support, findings are adequate if they are sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts
to disclose the steps by which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.
14. Parent and Child e»3.3(7)
Although trial court is accorded discretion in calculating self-employed spouse's
gross income for child support purposes,
court must consider which expenses are necessary in order to make child support determination. U.CJU953, 78-45-7.5(4)(a).
15. Parent and Child e=>3.3(6, 10)
Specific and detailed findings of fact as
to which expenses from self-employment are
necessary to spouse are required when determining child support, so that Court of Appeals can ensure that trial court's calculation
of payor spouse's gross income is rationally
based. U.OA.1953, 7&-4&-7.5(4)(a).

18. Divorce <3=*184(10)
When challenging trial court's finding.,
of fact in divorce proceeding, party mugt
marshall all evidence supporting trial comfg
findings and then show evidence to be legally
insufficient to support findings; if party chaj.
lenging finding fails to marshall supporting
evidence, trial court's finding will not be disturbed on appeal.
19. Divorce <s=>307
Substantial evidence was presented to
trial court supporting its finding, in making
child support determination, regarding value
of father's business, and mother, in challenging those findings, failed to marshal supporting evidence and demonstrate that it was
unsupportive of trial court's finding.

L.G. Cutler, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Joanne Pappas White, Price, for Appellee.
Before DAVIS, Associate P.J., and
GREENWOOD and WILKINS, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Defendant Jan E. Breinholt appeals from a
final decree of divorce entered on June 14,
1994. We reverse and remand in part, and
affirm in part
I. FACTS

16. Divorce «=»286(2)
Trial court's actions in divorce proceeding regarding parties' property interests are
entitled to presumption of validity.

The parties were married in 1977. Shortly
after their marriage, defendant went to work
for afinancecompany in Price, Utah, earning
approximately $3.50 per hour. Defendant
subsequently obtained a position as a receptionist for a coal company making $650 per
month. Six months later defendant transferred to a different department within the
company and increased her gross monthly
income to $1200. Defendant left the employ
of the coal company in November 1981 to
give birth to the parties, first child.

17. Divorce <s=>286(5)
Trial court's valuation of marital property will not be disturbed absent clear abuse of
discretion.

At the time of their marriage, plaintiff was
working for a cement company earning approximately $42,000 annually and enjoying
the use of a company car. Plaintiff left the
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cement company in February 1985 to begin a
family business by the name of Breinholt
Music (the business). Both parties worked
exclusively at the business until the birth of
their second child, when defendant stayed
home to care for the parties' two children.
Thus, defendant has not worked outside the
home since late 1988. In February 1992,
plaintiff was appointed as a county commissioner for Carbon County, earning approximately $21,000 annually,1 which was in addition to the income drawn from the business.
The parties separated in November 1992,
aid plaintiff filed for divorce in July of 1993.
A trial was held on March 7, April 14, and
April 15,1994. The parties primarily disputed the valuation of and income from the
business, which affected the property distribution and the calculation of child support
and alimony.
Both parties presented extensive expert
testimony on both issues. Although the experts agreed for the most part on the valuation method, their opinions regarding the
value of the business diverged greatly; plaintiffs expert valued it at $118,000, and defendant's expert valued it as high as $180,000.
The principal difference between the valuations arose due to the amount of personal
expenses each expert determined should be
added back into the business profits and a
reasonable salary for plaintiffs services.2
After considering "both appraisals, the economic conditions in the area and the costs of
replacing the business," the trial court found
that the business was worth approximately
$100,000. Although the trial court specifically declined to address the issue of the personal "expenses aggressively deducted by the
[parties] on their income tax returns[,]" the
court stated that it "considered all of the
evidence on that issue" in determining the
business's value.

abuse of discretion? (2) Did the trial court
err by failing to determine what expenses
were necessary for the operation of the family business for child support purposes? and
(3) Did the trial court err in finding that the
value of the business was $100,000?
III. ANALYSIS
A. Alimony
[1-3] "Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony . . . and will
be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated."
HvweU v. HowelL 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah
App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
We review a trial court's conclusion of law
with respect to alimony awards for correctness, according no deference to the trial
court. Id If, however, we are charged with
the task of reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, we will reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous. Id
Defendant takes issue with the trial court's
alimony award, claiming that the trial court
erred by (1) failing to enter appropriate findings of fact supporting the award and (2)
refusing to consider plaintiffs unearned income and income from his second job in its
alimony calculation. We address each claim
in turn.
1. Failure to Enter Sufficient Findings of
Fact

[4-6] Defendant argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in fashioning the
alimony award because it failed to enter sufficient findings regarding the parties' financial needs. It is well established that the
" function of alimony is to provide support
for the [receiving spouse] as nearly as possiDefendant appeals the trial court's valua- ble at the standard of living [he or] she
tion of the business, child support, and alimo- enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the
ny awards.
[receiving spouse] from becoming a public
charge.'" Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,
II. ISSUES
1075 (Utah 1985) (quoting English v. EnDefendant raises several issues on appeal: glish, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). To
(1) Was the trial court's alimony award an attain these goals, the trial court must con*• Plaintiff was elected to a full tenn in November
1994.

2.

Defendant's expert also had a mathematical
error of $7300 in his calculations.
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sider (1) thefinancialconditions and needs of
the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the
receiving spouse to support him or herself;
and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support Id. An underlying factor
regarding the payor spouse's ability to provide support is the payor spouse's financial
need. "[T]he payor spouse's reasonable
needs are a necessary subsidiary step in
determining the ability to provide support."
WiUey v. WMey, 866 P.2d 547, 551 & n. 1
(Utah App.1993). The trial court is required
to enter sufficient findings on the three enumerated factors, and we will reverse if it fails
to do so unless the relevant facts contained
within the record are " 'clear, incontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding
in favor of the judgment'" Howell, 806 P.2d
at 1213 (quoting Andersen v. Andersen, 757
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah App.1988)).
[7] In the case at bar, the trial court
made no findings of defendant's financial
needs as required, nor did it makefindingsof
plaintiffs financial needs, an "underlying factual determination . . . required for an assessment" of plaintiffs ability to provide support WiUeyi 866 P.2d at 551. Although
each party testified regarding their monthly
expenses, the trial court did not enter findings regarding the reasonableness of the expenses. Based on this failure, "we remand
forfindingson each party's reasonable needs
so we can determine if the court abused its
discretion in setting the amount . . . of the
alimony award." Id.
We note that because the court must enter
findings on plaintiffs fmftT*<*ifll needs and
ability to pay support, this necessarily requires findings regarding plaintiffs personal
expenses, if any, paid by the business. The
Utah Supreme Court has held that when
determining a self-employed payor spouse's
ability to provide support, the trial court
must examine "[tjhe full profit produced by
the business, adjusted by the court to take
into account legitimate and reasonable needs
of the business." Janes, 700 P.2d at 1076
(emphasis added). In the case at bar, there
was substantial evidence before the trial
court that the parties expensed personal
items through the business. Thus, determining which personal expenses plaintiff deducts

from business profits is essential for a <*•
rect representation of plaintiffs ability ^
provide support. If plaintiff expenses
large amount of personal items from th
business, this will have the effect of lowerm*
the business's profitability and, hence, p l ^
tiffs ability to provide support. Thus, the
personal expenditures must be added back
into the business profits, providing the court
with a truer picture of plaintiffs finance
abilities and augmenting plaintiffs ability to
provide defendant with alimony support
2. Failure to Consider Unearned Income
and Income From Second Job
The trial court refused to consider plain,
tiffs unearned income and incomefromhis
second job in fashioning the alimony award
stating in its findings of fact:
18. . . . Since marital assets were divided
equally and neither party has substantial
non-marital property, the courtfindsthat
investment "unearned" income is presumed to be equal, insubstantial in comparison with "earned" income and, therefore, excluded from the alimony calculations.
19. . . . Utah law is clear that the Court
should consider only the incomefromthe
equivalent of one (I) full-time job in setting
child support, § 78-46-7.5(2) Utah Code
Annotated (1993). This Court believes
that the policy behind that rule applies
with even greater force when considering
the issue of alimony. Accordingly, the
Court did not consider Plaintiffs earnings
from his second job in setting alimony.
The trial court's statement of the law regarding income from plaintiffs second job
and unearned income is incorrect as it applies to the issue of alimony. This court has
previously held that when determining an
alimony award, "it is appropriate and necessary for a trial court to consider all sources
of income that were used by the parties
during their marriage to meet their selfdefined needs, from whatever source—overtime, second joby self-employment, etc^ as
well as unearned income." Crompton *
Crompton, 888 P.2d 686,690 (Utah App.1994)
(emphasis added). See also Paffd v. Paffi
732 P.2d 96, 102 (Utah 1986) (holding trial
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grort did not abuse its discretion by considering payor's spouse's income in determining
payor's ability to pay alimony); Yeldermanv.
jgdderman, 669 P^d 406, 409 (Utah 1983)
•gcourt considered income sources in addition
to employment income in determining alimony); Osguthorpe v. Osgvthorpe, 804 P.2d 530,
m (Utah App.1990) (same); Ruksam v.
Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 125-26 (Utah App.
4987) (holding that retirement and disability
jjay properly considered in addition to emfioyment income in determining alimony).

items of income into consideration when determining whether the .amount of alimony
awarded was correct
B. Child Support Determination
Defendant next assigns error to the trial
court's failure to enter findings of fact regarding the necessary business expenses
when it calculated plaintifPs gross income for
child support purposes.

[10-13] A trial court is accorded "considerable discretion in adjusting the financial
interests of divorced parties and, thus, the
court's "actions are entitled to a presumption
of validity.'" AUred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108,
1111 (Utah App.1990) (quoting Hansen v.
Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.),
cert denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)). We
will not reverse a child support determina[9] Additionally, unearned income must tion "absent 'manifest injustice or inequity
be considered by the trial court when fash- that indicates a clear abuse of . . . discreioning the alimony award. The third Jones tion;" Jensen v. Botucut, 892 P.2d 1053,
factor IB the ability of the supporting spouse 1055 (Utah App.) (quoting Hansen, 736 P.2d
to provide support. 700 P.2d at 1075. The at 1056, cert denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah
trial court found that each party had approxi- 1995)). Additionally, a trial court is required
mately $6000 per year in unearned income.4 to enter detailed and specific findings on all
The trial court felt that this amount was material issues "which must be considered
insignificant and, in any event, a wash. We when making a child support award." AUdisagree and conclude that it affects plain- red, 797 P.2d at 1111. If it fails to do so, we
tiff's ability to provide support as well as will reverse " "unless the facts in the record
defendant's need and, accordingly, must be are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
considered by the trial court 5
supporting only a finding in favor of the
While consideration of the additional in- judgment,"'" Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d
come may or may not result in an adjustment 909, 911 (Utah App.1988) (quoting Acton u
°f the award, we hold the trial court abused J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)
its discretion by refusing to consider plain- (citation omitted)). Findings are adequate if
tiffs income from his county commission job they are ""sufficiently detailed and include
^d the parties' unearned income in calculat- enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps
^g the alimony award. On remand, we in- by which the ultimate conclusion on each
^nict the court to take these additional factual issue was reached; " Stevens v. Ste(8] Not only does the law require that
Hie trial court consider plaintifPs income
from a second job, but plaintiff also testified
that the parties used the county commission
income to pay household expenses.3 This
fact supports our conclusion that the income
must be considered in the alimony calculations.

*• Plaintiff claims that his income as county commissioner was not part of the family's historical
earnings because he was appointed to the commission only six months before the parties separated, and therefore the income should not be
considered on that basis. However, this court
has held that when calculating alimony, the trial
court should look at the standard of living which
exists at the time of trial. Howell v. Howell, 806
p
-2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817
p
-2d 327 (Utah 1991). This exercise is "consistent with the goal of equalizing the parties' post
divorce status." Id.

4. Although the trial court did not support this
amount with sufficient evidentiary findings, neither party disputes the amount.
5. The fact that plaintiff has $6000 in additional
annual income does not necessarily mean defendant is entitled to additional alimony. Conversely, the fact that $6000 of defendant's needs are
satisfied does not necessarily mean that alimony
will be reduced by that amount.
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vens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah App.1988)
(quoting Acton, 737 P.2d at 999).

of validity.'" Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 Po^
585, 588 (Utah App.1993) (quoting Argyk v
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah lag*))
Thus, "ihe trial court's valuation of marital
property will not be disturbed absent a clear
abuse of discretion." Id. When challenge
a trial court's findings of fact, the party must
"marshal all the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings and then . . . show the evi.
dence to be legally insufficient to support the
findings." Rudman v. Rudman, 812 ?2<\ 73
79 (Utah App.1991). If the party challenging
the finding fails to marshal the supporting
evidence, the trial court's finding will not be
disturbed on appeal. See id*

[14,15] In the case at bar, plaintiff is
self-employed. Accordingly, his gross income for child support purposes is calculated
by "subtracting necessary expenses required
for self-employment . . . from gross receipts." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(4)(a)
(Supp.1995) (emphasis added). Section 7845-7.5(4)(a) further provides that "[t]he income and expenses from self-employment
. . . shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the
parent to satisfy a child support award.
Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may
be deducted from gross receipts." Id. (emphasis added). Although the trial court is
accorded discretion when applying section
78-45-7.5(4), Jensen, 892 P2d at 1057; see
also Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065,
1067 (Utah App.1994) (stating trial court is in
best position to determine what expenses are
necessary), it must consider which expenses
are necessary in order to make a child support determination. Thus, in order for this
court to ensure that the trial court's calculation of plaintiffs gross income was rationally
based, specific and detailed findings of fact
on the issue are necessary: See Stevens, 754
P.2d at 959. However, the court made no
findings regarding the necessary expenses of
the business, which was a highly contested
issue between the parties. The lack of specific findings on this critical issue and the
absence of a clear, uncontroverted record
require that we reverse and remand the case
to the trial court for specific findings to
support its child support award.6

[19] After reviewing the record, we hold
that not only was there a substantial amount
of evidence presented to the trial court supporting its finding regarding the value of the
business, but defendant has failed to marshal
that supporting evidence and demonstrate
that it was unsupportive of the trial court's
finding. Thus, we affirm the trial court's
finding regarding the value of the business.

C. Business Valuation
[16-18] Lastly, defendant claims that the
trial court's finding that the business had a
value of $100,000 was in error.1 The trjaJ
court's actions regarding the parties, property interests " 'are entitled to a presumption

Additionally, we reverse and remand the
child support determination so sufficient findings of fact may be entered regarding the
necessary business expenses. If the trial
court determines that the initial child support award was in error after considering the
necessary expenses of the business, it may

IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court erred by failing to enter sufficient findings of fact regarding the parties' financial needs and further
erred by not considering plaintiffs income
from his second job and the parties' unearned income when calculating the alimony
award. Thus, we reverse and remand so the
trial court may enter furtherfindingsin light
of this opinion and reconsider the alimony
award after it has entered the appropriate
and necessary findings.

6. "Our holding should not be interpreted to 7. Although defendant attempts to couch her
mean that the trial court's decision as to the
claim as a failure to enterfindingsregarding the
amount of child support is incorrect, but oiiry
return of investment value employed by the trial
that the court'sfindingsof fact are insufficient to
court her argument is essentially an attack 00
allow appellate review" of the trial court's deterthe value the trial court assigned to the business.
mination of plaintiffs gross income for child
Thus, we treat it as such.
support purposes. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 912.
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«iter a child support order consistent with
its findings.
Lastly, because the evidence supports the
trial court's finding regarding the valuation
of the business and because defendant has
Med to correctly challenge this finding, we
affirm the trial court's determination on this
issue.
GREENWOOD and WILKINS, JJ„
toncur.
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